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INFUR#\T]ON  1ilfuO
Disparate Aspects of #. SeLocted. Tariff  Struotures (r)
Forclvorcr.
The following study is  of a statisticell- rratu"r'e:;rcl,  a.s such, it  aims
at supplying overall pror.isional information, for  gorrer:eJ- use, on the
tariffs  in  question. The findings are pr.r.rcl-y rlescriptive ana clo noL iurply
any official  attitud.e on the part of the Statistieal  Office nor therefore
of tho E.E.C. Conirni.ssion. It  should. be noted that the figures given i-n
no way prejuclge the results of inore speclfic stuiies  which might be put irr
"hand by the iij.E.C. Cor,rinission prior  to tariff'  nego-biations.
1..'  Slgnificrjnce  and limitations  of  cornl:arisons "be-bwgen tar:iffs
In the years.r?r"" the entry in'bo forcE; of the Rone Treaty, iri'ber-
national C.iscussions ancl negotiations on custonis tariffs,  partioularly
in  GATTI have becone more frequsnt ancl far-r.eaching" Tire objeet of
these nogotlations is  to reciuce by, uiutual concessions the custor;s duties
on imports into the various countrios. Such concessions  were foliierly
discussed. bilaterally  cr.nd. product by product, and- it  was sufficlent  for
the parties to consult each other and to coliate  the:i"r ov'rn tarriffs  and.
their  own import statistics  case by case to appraise the econonlc
effects of their  decisions. l-rater there iliir,s a na.rkeil'berrclency to  aci-opt
much more general lines of appro,;ch bar;ed. on the s.ystcriatic application
of reductions to large groups of products. It  is  then useful to nake a
broad,er appraisal of custcins tariffs,  and for  this  pr:.rp'ose ii  is  natural
to turn to  statistical  techniclues, r,ru'hich are th.e rilearls pal excellence of
presenting information in  synop-bic f'orn.
We i:rust renember, however, tha't as ::egar'1s j-n"be::rrational  cor,iparison
the assessnent of tariff  probloms in  statis"tlcal'beruis is  still  in its
inf,ancy and encounters clifficultios  sir,ilar  to those net r,,ritir in  the
earliest  att.enipts to establ-isli interna'bional 'trad.e stati-stios  : the
Fretic1efirstappearet1as|''Astatistica1couparisonofthecorulon
external tariff  of the.iij.E,C., the tariff  of tire Urri-ted. States of .s.rnerica
and the tariff  of the United" Kingdon of Great Britain  and. l{orthern Ireland,rr,
by iViarcol lliesnage, Chief of Division, Statistical.  Office of the Juropoan
Comr,runities.  I't  was first  publlshed. in  'rfnfori:iatj-ons Statistiquesr', a
publication of the Statistical  Office.
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tariff  nomencl-atures differ,  the duties appry sometj-mes to quanlities,
sometimes to .ralues (or botk) ,  the value-s tbenselves are assessed
di-fferently,  btre rate  of du.ty cein vary ber'pora::i1y and a-lso !I  country
of origrn,  and its  appJ-icai;j.on riay be subject Lo ex:cl*.iorrs (nrocessing
traffic  ,  tari ff  quotas, etc " ) .
That is  why, as 'blnings s ba-ni-l at  present r d*rc::al siatist  j-ca1
surveys in  thj-s field  can do lro rrrore th*n pr ovi-Ce info:'mai;ion whicli
vr'ill  help to:larif3  ideas but lvj-]l- not in:-tse,i.f  be a sufficient  basis
"'o1' well-f ortird.ed ;i Lidgernentr:. Tirc p:'e s<rnt stud;' is  no excepbion and
care musL tlrere'fore bi-' ta.ken not to athril:ute  -uo tlic frguros a degree
,o f' 
. precisi-on lrrh.ich i.hey cannot liarre .
Furthernore ir  must noi be forgott*:n that. custorns duties are oniy
on€ factor  tenrirr:si to restrict  traoe. A1iilougl. cf ton c+n;icierable,
tlrcir  pt"otective er'fcct rs  sometimes Iess 1-]iari ';l'.Lal of  qrrotas or of
c;ertain ::egulations or even administrative formalicies.  tiny attempt
to  ansvler by vray of rough-and-rcacly  avcrages the corrrnlex question:
riV'lhat i-s the level  of protection of  one country in  r':lati  on to  some
other country?rr t,vould l-eaC nowhcre.
..
2, :  Method of  comrerrison usc{
A first  choice presents itself  trhen comparing' turo tariffs:  the
dr.rties can either  be sLudieC ind{",pendently <;r'in refation  to the vsfutne
of  trade to which they apply.  Thcsc iwo methods are often distin-
guished as non-weighr;ed calculations and vreighted calculations
(:-"e. weighted by tiie  va-'1-ue of the irnports).
At fj-rst  s:Lght ii;  v,roulC seem that wcighted caiculations should
s:ive  a  more ::ccriraf  .-\ rri ntrir.a -  It  See.mS natufal  to  min.i-fiize  the irrvr  v  Gvv'tf  uuv
in.fluc;ncc cf  dutj-'.s wh'ch appJ-; only  bc s:nal-l quantitres  of  imports  and
tO  oiVe  l,trOt"r: W,.jnh*  tn  i:ttioq  r:rhi^h  rr'.:-,1rr  f 6  1n^rna  nrran*i*ig-e.  HOW- vv  6rv  !  .rrL/r  e  rrJ--irl!L  u  '  Jif,UJgL-  lrllJ,UIl  :-.FIJIJ  tJv  !c1r  6c  Yaarru4LJ
ever, the objcction. has k,een raised. that  the picture  obtained from
these vr6i ghtecl calculations :-e distorted  by the very ef f ect of  the
duties on inpo::ts.  A \tcry hrgh dut,y w'i 11 greatl;r rec'ucc or even
suppress the cor:resporlding imports anc ther:eblr losc all  or part  of its
signif;cance in  ihe calculations.  'Ihr: result  rs  tLiilt weighted
calcula.tions tenci to underestimatc  the protecti.ie cffect  of the duties
j.n clue stion,  Iiiealiy ,  'bir: ctuf j-es shouicl there f ore bc weightecl ,  not
trv  thp  nr:f.rra'l  j rnnnr+c  l,:r+ h.'  thOSe r,VhiCl: .WoU]d be  rnacie if  there  Were
no customs Cut:r-es.  Such a cal.culation rvoulu r:e qui-re a 6ystenatic
estimate, product by prc,luct, of the ef f eci of the law of irnport
fluctuatj-on according to1r1gty.  For the birte.' bcing this  is  outside
the real-m of possJ.bilit;"r'.
Moreover therc are other preicti-cal obstacir;s evt:n if  such
estimates are not attempted.  The principai  onc is  that al-l the
nornencl":turcs dif f er ariong th.-:ms.'Irres, Thie i-s true of tarj-f I
nomenclatures  and ncmenclaturr:s  of irnport s:-iatistics l'rithin  a sipgle
countrv and tarif  f  or statistical.  nomcnclatures of  d,i f fere nt  countries.
..  t/  ..  t
(t )  Thc  rrener..ll  f.ron6  i s-  h6y1 ;.r,-n  nrc,l-i chrl;fg:  tl.e1'e  wOUIC firSt  be  a bLrr!;a  :Lr  vr  srrq  !e  t  /!vvr\  ,  ea  t
mrnrlrr^-i  A^^'lihG:  in  imnorts  as  J-.lrr: d'riv  rns6-  1-1r..n -  nnt''iA  fa]l  When  i': 6l  *uu(rr  sgvJIIIv  IIMPvr  uo  qlr  r  vu\'  t
reached a certa:iri cr.iticat  f igure.  This f igur"c -'rould corrcspond to
the maxir:nun i;rice  increase which'can be absorbed by d.ifferences in
productivi;y  frorn one country i;o another and beyond which irnports cea,se
to be competitivc"-1- P-6,/61
Finally,  even supposing the se obstacle s l';ere overcome, the
structural  dif f erences bcflveen tlie vo-rious count::ies' imports wotild
still  have to  be considered.  Ii  rnighb be sarid that  a useful
comparison of scveral fariffs  coul-C only bs macie on the basis of  a
"o**on weighting, ancl horc thc crit<.:ria of selectioti are difficult  to
work out.  -  One solution  v,'ould be to usti i-mporrs into  the whole Sroup
of countries sbudied but tiris  would etrctirg::Iy conrirlicate the nomen-
clature probler..
In view of  i,he6r-. clifficulties  it  secrie,l iidvisable, as a first
stage, to turir to  Lhu tipe  of calcuiabj-cli knov,'n a'Ls t'ncn-weightcdrt,
whictr, uu *u have saiil ,  rneans considering thc duties isdependentiy of
thc correspon.ling tra,l-;.  This in  fact  j-s the ncthod used ln  the
PFcccnt sttrdY.
It  should first  be noted that in  :'ee-fity the absence of weighting
means only the rron-utilization  of  the irnport valuee and that  anothcr
typc of v,rlignting is  irievitably  introducecl by reerson of the structure
of-tnu  tariit.  'Ihusr in  a tariff  where certain products are sub-
divided many times (textiles  in  bhe US tariff  for  instance) the dutie';
on the products in  quesfion wiil  have a higher frequency in  a statisti-
cal clistribution  .tt,i *  greatel weight in  an arifhmctical  average of
du tic s
In order tc  prcvcnt this  iurplici"  i,vei5llting through the number oi
sub-divisions from seriously disiorting  conparisons between the tariffs
stud.ied, t.hese had to be reduced to a conmon structure,  that is  to  sayt
th.e riuties of the threc tariffs  ha-C. to be re-arranged.  according. to a-.
single list  of srrb-di.risioils,  It  follovrs that the results  shown below
nay Ciffez' fron thosc of similar  calculations which rnay have been made
elsewhere on the ba.sis of the structure proper fo  each tariff' 
,
lioreover it  is  importi'.nt tc  note: th:rb the .s:-mp]..e arithmetical
average of thc d,uti,:s c;i1cui,r,+"cd for  thr: whole of  each tariff  is
"pp"u"iu.biy 
higher tb.an the averirSe oi  thc duti<.rs wcighted' by fhe
var.ue of inrporis.  In  f :ct  chc simpl c ave rir8'l is  grcatly-influenced by
the dutiers on manufacture'1  products, whicir I're rnuch more clifferentiateC
than raw naterialg  ernd bear higher duties ;o fhat  their  rfarithmetical
weightil j-s rnuch higher than their  actua.l relative  importance in  imports
and ten<1s to  increase the simple everage.  Bv contrast,  in  the
iveighted aveirage a high weighling is  given to Cuties on raw matcrialst
whj-ch are geneiall-y small or ni1-, witl  the:result  that  this  averagc is
red',rced.
i.  Thc outies uscd
A regrouping of  the tarj-ffs  of the various countries of Europe
and Norih Arnerica ir:  acco::dancc with the structure of the coamon
external tariff  was nade hy Potitical  and Economic Planninfl and
published in  j-ts stuoy rrAtl:rntic Tariffs  and Tradet' (LonAoi I  L962) '"
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The United ,3tates and United l(lngdon duties given in  this  work were
used as a,. basis for  the prcecnt stuii.y,  For the United States these
duties werc d.rawn j'rom tte  riTarif f  Ciassificabion Studyttr United
States Tariff  Corntiiission, vlashingtorrr D.0.,  15 November 1950'  They
thercfore clo not takc ,irito ;rccount 'bhc amenCnerits  r,rade after  the-
adoption of  f;hu Tariff  Commj-i;sj-on's  ;oropos:I.e iri  'Juno L962'  For the
United Kingdorn 11.,e Srrbies arc the' rron-prr,'fcrentii,l duti,;s in  force on
t  l{arch 1962 (rnost-f a'vourerl-naltion  C1ATT Cuties).  Ad justments have
been made to  cllminatL.: f::on certain  dutics thc c1r:ment considered to
be purcly fisc;rI,  Tiie r;i'.ili::  is  ref':rred  to  Lhe work u*-ntlonecl for
fUrther cletails on ihc re-arranglment  mir,1 u r:n'f rh;  uxceptions it
involves as well  as on the naturc oi  tirc crufies,
Herc we wil-l ncntion orrly tvro pointe vvhii:h fi-ly ilffect  the statis-
tical- Cistriblticrr  cf  tire cluties.  ru'her scvcral Cuiite; in  .rnother
tari-ff  corresltond to a single duty in  the comtnon external tariff  the
work quoted rneniions only the lowest and the highest of  these dutie,s.
For the calculirtions in  this  study in  such case the two dutj-es
mentioned have beett uncel and the corresponding duty in  the common
external tariff  rcpeated esch time"  In  this  way a conlnon weighting
structure is  obtained in  whictr r. line  alwerys includes one dutyr and
^-1"  rnn each tariff.  Thc omission of the intermcdiary duties ullg  vlrlJ  !  rvr  e
within  I  heaCing,of the coinrnon extern?l ta{iff  is  unl-ikely to  have much'
Criirution of the duties of  each tariff
coneiderec] in  j-solation.  TLre riistribut j-on of  the- differences  betv\teen
the d"uties of the CET and those of another tariff  could be inflected
in  sucli a way as slightly  to increasc ihc relabive frequence of  the
diffenences  vuhos,, abiclutr-'vafuc is  high, that  is  to  sa;r to "flatterr
outrr the distribution.  Howeverr a calculation  uras made lo  verify
important sections of  the Nomer:.cfature  on the basis of  complete dove-
.r-ri tino  nf  f hr" CET and the US tarif  f ,  wtrich thus included nll  tire
duties of the lattsi:  tariff  for  the Bru-ssels headings covere'd'  The
results  of  this  cetl-culation arc not e.ppreciabl.y diffcren+" from those
used here.
The other poj.nt concernc,l thc hr.ndling of  specific  or mixed a,rti""(1).
In  the work menlioned-, such duties have bcen repliiced as far  as possible
by estj-mates of  their  ilverage -incidencc expr''ssed es a pc:'centage of
trrtn*.  trvhere the wor:k gives no such estimatcr anY corresponding dutree
mentioned for  the other tariffs  have also been omitted fron t'hc
calculations.
As regards the conmon externerl tariff  thc duties appearirig in
rrAtlantic fariffs  an,J Trad"ert have been replerced by the contractual
duties of 1 July T)6J or, vrhen there were no conrractual drrtrest by
(f)  Specific duties are Cuties expressed as a fixed  amount
of quantity,  ancl mixed cluties are duties expressed as
of  the value but associated. with  e, rninimum or naxirnum
unit  of quantity.
, . ./ ,..
n.,n  rrni  t
I'!!
a perc e nl&$t;
^La-^.. 
nnn !1rqr  6v  yL-a)-
duties on the'List  at  that date.  Thsse duties
account of  tl/v. conce"csions gr'anted in  GIiTT iari
to  tir.at ciat.\-1'j.  0n the otherltand no account
temporary rechictions or sits5;ensicns of duticl;.
"'-6/o+
consequently t,ake
€f  nr-mnli  -l-i  nnc praor
has been takerr of
is  fh.ercfore distinetly  lower than
which itself  i-s slightly  below the
4, The ficld  coverec
The analysis has been confincd to  Lhe iri'odncts co.rerecl by
Chapters 25 Lo 99 af  +.hc Brussi:l; i\orncnciaiurc, whiclr covcr 1,11 indu-q-
triai  ps.oducts bur. cxcir.rde rrgricultural. ancl fc'od pro,lucts.  For *'he
latter  it  frcqucrLti;r h:'rppens :ithi:r'  that  tiie rlutics are ropiaced by
a d.iffcrent  fonn cf  clia.rge at  the frontier  (the case of produc'us
suhjcci; to  1.,-'vy under the UEC comtnon agricuiturlrl  pol-icy)  or that
varJ,"irr.g re gu1at.:.Ctis ii:'.it;: the rclati..re cff ;ct  of' thc cuSton:s  du Ui.s
widely dif f erent ilrom one country to inotiri:r.
ECSC products uni.er the Brussels i'tromenclature  treaCings 27.AIt
?7.O2 and ex 2?.O4 (coal ancl l-ike fuels),  for  which there is  no
unified  Conmunity outy, arc srlso e:<cluded, as are the petroleun products
under BN headings 27.i0,  27.\L,  2?,12 arnd ex 27.L1 for  which CET dutics
have not yet been fj.xed .
5.  Generallesuii;s (see ta-bles and graphs No. 1)
The tariffs  conpared rvj-ll bc indicated by the following
abbreviations:
CET :  Cornmon External Tariff  of  EEC
ub'I  :  ur)l-ted  Dtates  r:1rl-I I
UKT :  Unitetl KinECon Tariff  .
The sj-mple ;rritlrrnetical- averagcu (for  al-1 industrial  prodrrcts)







The ave::erge lr:vel  of the CET
that  of tire iJnited Staces tarif  f ,
United i(ingdom tariff  .
..  r/.,.
(f)  It  ivas not possiblr-. to  take in'bo irccor-rnt in  the calcuiati-ons  the
concessions granbed by the .inj-tecl Slatcs and the lJnited Kingdom
at  these negotirtions.  Thc ri:si;It  is  a slight  increase j^n the
d.erriations bctwe en the CET and the other two tar"iffs  rnentioned  hez'e.
However, this  increasc uoes not cxcecci cne point on thc average f'rr
the various catcgori-es an'i cl-asses of dutics considercd, and thus
doc:s not appre-ciably alter  tl:rc relativ.:  situa+.ions described here.The pattern of











The nodc (or niost frcqucnt clut;') is  ]4); for  the CBT ancl LAi f or
the other tvro tar:iff;s,  ilor,vcver, this  i;;  of no importance for  the
general conpa.rrsr:n oJ' thu tlriffl  iq.rr']s,  first  bccause it  tioes not take
account of all  the Cu+;ies rnd, scconcly, i;iciru6c thr: distributicns  are
not unirnoda].  ?hc fru(iucnc,y of  ilrourl'lD rr-dtr,bi:r:rl  :i-s ainost always
highcr than tii:rt  of intermecliary duti,,s but this  feirture is  much more
marked in  thi: UST, anii cven noi"e so in  fl;u IIKT, tlrrrr j-n the CET, Thus
the ItinternudiiLryfi dubics b<;twcen ]- an,,1 i"i/n i-rrclurlcd nufiki.;r 4Li in  the
UST, 6e in  thc UIiT anta. -/'l+ Ln bhe CET.  It  foliovis th&c ih,: CnT, with
fewer tAi  d:ntj-cs than the other fwo +-ariffs,  has in  th': aggregatc more
dubics at  or lowcr than IO/c 1>41., rrs ?]glirfit  L13O and l-+46) and
conversely fewer duties  abo,te IA/o.
Tfre aif terences betwe en tirc aver?.Ees, medians and modes of  each
'. tarif  f  moreover ref lect  the dif f erences in  b.ht". f orm of  frequ*ncy
, distributions  vrliich rvi1l now be consiCered in  greater detail.  The
distribution  of the CET duti<-.s is  the least  disperseci ernd the most
symmetrical;  in  other vrorrls the CET, in  relabion to  the other tarif  fst
has nore 6rr/ero.Be duties,  fewer low dutice and s*il].  fewer high Cuties:
8Q6 of the cluties are between 4 and f9%.  The ciistribution  of  the
','US tariff  is  thr: v;id.est :rnd thc nost asymmetriceii.  It  i-ncludes more
1ow or zero duties bui,  :rbove c.11 , nore high and rven lrcry high duties
.,t(ttie latter  havi. a. gru"f trr  influenc,,' on. thc arithmel;j-cel average than
on the median. which ls  thcrefore lcwer),  EA'l of the dutie$ are
betwcen 2 and.38%,  The clistribution  of thc Unitcd l{ingdon tariff  is
ra.the:' na.rrowor thiin that  of  tire US tar:l-f f  but d-l is  also rathcr
asymmetrical,  Its  salien'b. feature is  that  lt  is  concentrirted at  three
lcveIs of duty (tCt/", ZtP/o and 31%), whicir gir.es it  cL vorly oisjointed
forrn (ttris  is  why the nnediair and- cspeci4lly the mode 3rc of no great
significance for  this  tarriff),
34%.
8U/o of  tlne iluties arc betvre en 7 and
Thc proportion of  th.  zero dufies does no'; gruatly differ  frorn one
tariff  to ttre other.  It  Ls B1/" for  the CET and -iiKT and IUlo for  the UST.
The proportion of  dr-rties at  or below LCP/o is  4]L'" tn';hc  CET, 'J5.5% tn
the UST and JB.5% in  thc Ui(T.  96% of the CET auti-es are aL"?&  i)'
or  less1  as againsL'/2% for  the UST and,69/6 for the 1.ji{T,  Only an
j-nfinitesimr:.l proporti-on (OJ76) of  CET dritj-es is  above 25% vtiiexeas the
proportion is  2l% tor tire USA and 25'p ior  thc UIi,  V% of US duti-es
and 2l% of UK duties are even above 3O%.
(f)  Va.lues which are such t]naL Ja%
them.  The mediansr as well  as
been calculated ou thc basis of
^  -  rta or  L70.
..,/  , ,,
of the Cuties arc below or above
the deciles arrd ihc  r:ror1 c,  ha're
frequenc;' distriburions  pcr class_ ?  p_6/64
5. Distrihuliqn  of deviati-o@  (see tables"-and graphs No' 2)
The general ,rverage of dcvlrbj-ons in  absoiute vetlue is  9,9
between thc CET encl UST an'l 8.8 betrrcen the CET ancl UKT'  These
figureo give a preliniinary i-nd.ic.:tlcn of tiic  irvcrlgc Cisparity
between these tariffs.
As be twcr-:n the U$T an4 tirc CET' 6'/o of  iiLc clufies are equal ,  4B/"
of the deviari;ions aro not above 5,  anu ?O?'L ere trot above 1O'  I'Iearly
Ij% of thi: dcviations are highcr tir.rn 20, 6'ti art, higher tlian J0 and
I'3t'o hLgher thrn )0.
'  Betvui,cn thc lIi(T and the CE? LL/" ot  bhi: clrrtii:$ are =au:1 ,  45% ot
the deviaticn$ a;'il not abovc 5 ancl $t)i',t arc noi; i:bo'rc 1O;  8rt of  t'he
.  d*viations arr  trigh;:r tlre:', 2O ancl on1;r 1.iiJ r,inlie:: t-hirn J'U.
.ii  As to thc clirection of the <ieviafion.s, it  rnay be noted that 62%
,,, of  the us dutics  and, ?L'){ of  the uK duties are highcr than the cET
.', a,rti"".  The US anC UK duties (i-rc rnore than iO points above bhe CET
.  higher in  12.6 and 8,21'o of cirses.  Above 40 points tlie deviation
flrr:dLr.+ne1r becomes ncgligiblc  for  bhe UKT, but is  sti1l  2,9?6 f or  Llne
r+  eYsv,rvJ . UST
,..,,,i:.  Thc conclusion j-s that  l.hcrc are appre: ciable clisparities  between
,,. -.1the three tarif  fs,  thllt  virtually  al}  the h:gh disparities  concern  US
'.  o" UK duties above CET cluties, and that  ihe frcquenc;i  '-"'r' thesc cascs
, , is  greater for  tl:re UST ti'rarr for  the UKT'
? .  Conciitioqal distrioutign 
( 1). of--the-US-l-ni^aff-i!-felatiqn tq
the CET ( soc' tables  =
Study of thc ,listr.ibutj"on cf  US clutj-es itr  re l:ltion  to  the levef
of the correspcnding  CLiJI Cuties shorvs hor,'; far  i;here is  a conriection
between gre leve1 of  oach tarif  f  ior  ..:inilar  proiiucts ancl v;hcther this
connection is  close or rillnot().  ijrrt rlbovl, all  ihis  ti'pproa'ch  rnakes it
possible to  cie fine  c1e;rrl;r wh:rt is  rnc,rnt hy disparity  bctwecn tarif  fs.
The intensity  of tir,: link  could bc mcasurcd by i"tsing the
traditional  coef ficicnt  cf  linear  consf r aLnt, b',tt 1;his is  of iiLtle
interest  in  the casc in  point  anci hae not be';n calculatei' hc:e '  IL
seerned more useful to make a grlphic  exaninirtion of  .Lhe: c<''noiiional'
distrj-butions bringing out for  each class of  CET dutiEs thc tlispersior'
of the corresponding US dutics aroln'l their  me:ilia-n considcreci as a
central value.  /
(f )  Con<litional distributj-on  herc means tite d:Lstribution of  thc US
dut,ies corrcspond.ing;  bo CET duiicEr of a 5i','cri le ve1.'  For instatrce
298 headings have been fcund for  i,rrhich the CIlll has a zero rirrty.
The US cluties for  1!O of these dr'; also zcror. ior  JI  they a'rc
betwcen ]  anci 5';1, an4 tar i7  13i,'f:.vi;i..rr {: and 1Ui/ot etc'  'Ihis corl:es-
ponds to  the first  column in  I'abl:  J'  Es'clr coiumn of  i'he table
thus represenbs lh:.;stabe of d"istribu.tion of  uS duti.':s corr'.'sIronC'
ing to the leveJ of  CET duties sho'rn at  fiir  top'P-6/54
It  will  be noted first  that  on thc v,rhole the median of us duties
rises  in  step with thc CET duties.  This nei:rns that'  on the averaget
whe::e cET dubies are irighcrbhc cc:':rcsponiing lls dutics arc al-so
highc-r.  There is  thus a iink  bcl',veen thi  structurcs of the two
tarif  fs.  This is  noi surprising,  for  it  is  kno',vn thai  a conmton
feature of nost terrif fs  is  'uhai tlir.:y ttnC lo  teix products in  relatlon
to  thcir  oornplu.xj-ty of rf..brication.  This liriil  norcovcr be confirmed
late r  in  ihc dis;ributiorL  bv ca.te gori',s cf  product-s '
A mo:.e intercsting  fact  is  the vrriation  of  Lhe av€jrage disparities
j-n relation  v,rith the lcve}  of dutics,  iryh:Lch can bc i]]us+-rated by the
foilowing table:
L-j  6-tc  i1-i5  16-?a 2.L-25 25 and
over
Levef of CEt ttutic-e  O
l"{edian of  corrcsponcling
US duties  O
Inter-decile  disparity  2r,2
Deviat ion,/me'C.ia.n rat irr
9"4 12.8  1r.O
?-9.4 26.5  14. J
rB.9  19.0 23.5
t?.o  42,7 5,
1.L  2,L  2,3  ?.o  2.2  2.3
f r  \
By using the inte::-cleciie leviationtt'  as an'indicator  oi disper-
sion j-t  can be observed th.rt up t.o thc LAi Level- in  thc CET ciuties the
average disparity  of  thc  US cluties coniinucs to be of ihe sanc order
of magnitude in  :rbsolutc v,?}ue,  For highcf iluti".es +.he average
clispari.t.v increases in  al:solute value at  th<" sarie iime as the leve1 of
duties,  i;rnd roughl;V pro;,,ortionnte ly  wi*'1} the m,:Cian of US Cuties'
8.  Conditional clistfl,b{'Lj-on of  llre UK tariff  rrr relation  to
the CiiT (see tabic;s and gral,hs No. 4)
;rnaticn  of  'Li;r,, condi-tir:t-ral rtislributicn  cf  the uir. tariff
in  relation  to the CET cufls  for  sinrilair uern&fks bo the abovc on the
US tariff  as to the exlstence cfl i,i lilik  bctti,,'e crr the structures of  the
two tarif  f s:  on the avot a6e the ciut j,es tcncl to increase concurrently.
As regards ihe dispariLies  thene sccms to be no clear link  with tlie
]evel  of the duties.  Foll-owing the ;rhenorrtenon  a,iready noted iri  connec-
tion  with the ciistribution  of der,"iations, i.  e " ihe conccntrStion of  the
UK tariff  on certain  frequencic,'; of cui;j-es, graph 4 shovus that  thc
condi-tional ciistributions  of the Uli duties arc- very irregular  and this
gr.eatly rcduces thc significance of  fhe me'ti.:n anci decile characteris-
ii"r.  In  fact  these presuppose a- certain regularity  of distribut{  ons
and are i}l  adapteci io  the isavr-toothri pattern net with her'e'  It  may
nevertheless be concluclecl tirat  the average clispari-';;r is  fairly  large t
-"r *].n,rm]e r.,-e f hsn the CET/UST disparity  and not corrstan+.ly asymoetrical d.I  ulrvu6ri  rsDD  \
in  the,lirection  of  c>:ceeding thc CET, as il  tl,e case of the US tarj-ff"
.../...
(f ) The first  deci 1e is  the levcl  of  du';;r which is  such that  TCfl of  Lhe
dulies are bel-ow it '  The 9th dccilc  is  the lcvef  which is  such
that  1Oi5 of ihc  d.utir-rs are .ihov':; it. lltre intei'-decile  deviation
is  the  dif  f ere nce bcti,vec:n tir:se  tvlo levels.  It  thcref ore covers




1 o CoqperiscQ$  o-f rr::r:-n ciitcAqr'-i-,5 c--' .i"lr'c -lFcts
(see tabfes and graphs No. 5)
The categories of prod-ucts listed  herc harrc been defined according
to the ttre-erranged  headin6Sst'  usecr by the Statistici-r-1 Office of  the
Europcan Conmuni'bi"?_ lo  re -cli-r$si-i,y EECr s cr:tc::r:al lred e statistics  by
econonric cete goriu.c; \ r/ .
The arithrneiicei  avcrage 6f  1;he clutics for  ihese: catcgories works
out a,s follows:























CET UST  UKT
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Forali  ihcsi  catcgcries  tire  :iv€;ru.ge lcvel  ol  the  CET is  clearly
befovl that  of  -thc twc; otirr:r  tarif  fs  a:.ri the  devi-t-,tion betwe en thc
respect:-ve avcrages v.arious iittlc  irom  i)ne c;l.tL-€fcry io  another'
?hs €ryepsge: ]eve l. of'  the  three  t'rr:i"ff:;  varics  j-n fir.t: sarne direction
gccording  to  thc  familiilr  sf ructure;  rniriinuin riutics  f or  rlrv" matrrrials,
higher  dutics,  incr:irr;ing  lvith  tht,  clegrec cf. p; ocr:ssirg,  :[or semi-
proc).ucts.  Catpital  goocis are  chargcC less  than  c rh;:r  manuf ac turcd
--  ^,1 ,r ^ + d
!MUV  UD.
As in  bhe casc of the averages, the ovcrall  ::es;ul.ts rr:gardir:.g
comparative  C.ispc,rsion of  tariffs  arc vi.lid  for" Ltre various categories
of products.  Ti:e following  table sulns up tllc mrlirr f catures:
i'{in bh Cecj-ie Ir..ber-d.ecile
nl.rn  TTCq,l \J))L  (;U+





tiKT  CET USn  UKT
(f)  See Classific:ttion  St,etistique et
categorics vthicii follow  cQrrespond
Rar,v matr:riirls :rrd ',insr8\r: OI r  Cil t
Tarifairc  ,  thi-rtl  ,:riitioir.  f lie
to  bh" icl iowir:g ltcaiing;;:
Q3, C,.f ,  aj ,  05 ,  L2,  'L3 ,  L5,  16 ,
*a 4t  4)  44'
./Lt  -/rt  )v,
S enri -pr ortuc t s |  35 t  52;
Ecluipmen'b,: 7't, 72, 74, 75,,




-T t.  rnouscrl-aa
^^,,;  -,.^*t- Y 9U  J  IJTIIgII  U
4" Other prod.ucts
7,o  2,4 . g.Ly
7 "8 4"2 7.1
-1'l  a  -  1 j_r.  v  [  .  L
t.tt  !  t.- 
"' -'-f  .)  L).(
iL.2  g .7




'ar, z  ?tr, 2
J  /  .  )  L)  r  v
??, 78;
91, 92, 9i , 
c)4 ,, 9i , 95.!..
,.4
t 10 .r', F[6164
lo
The CEI is  in  all  c,f.ees lcss d"lcpersr"rd than bher othch: tu'o
tariffs,  which aiso shovr more pro.nounced asymmetry spreacil-ng  the
clistribution  tov;,rrJ-s the hi6hcr d.uti<.,s.  In  the raw matebials c.r.
category arr L-$haped distribut'ion  is  fout.d, f or tht; thre"' tariffs
witir rnaxirnum freqirency fcr  ihr,.: aero rlutles:  ?4/  for  C'ET, +6% tor
UST anrl TJI(T "  I'or seni-pr,rCuct;: ;l:rc conirioi:Liis't  du"ties a.re befween
5 and 10 fo:: the 'uhree ti,,,r'if fs.  but a hrglh frcquetrcy SZli') may
also bc nsier-l f or i;i' Jut,iis  i'r-t'.tecn J.r- irlrci )r'  CET iuties  on
capital  goo.is show a fr:-r'l;'  concentrateti .iin'[,ribuu:i-on"  9176 of  the
drrlies are bci,n,ee:: 6 tr.ld lO, as coinparerd tir"i i:h '7a1a of  ilie US clutic's.
Tn tiri  sl ..ilt..)rr.rr'\r l'na  l'r',:ritarr.cv  of  UK dl bi-:g  be1;v'roeri -t (,  irnci 20  ts
'lr  urj!D  va-vv.Jvf  .Y
high.  I'cr  thc  otrlcr  j-nil.ustrj-al  prociucts a consj-.i.'raL.lc proporti-oti
af  hi oh .rlrr+i '..'s in  1i1s. LT$ arrct Ul, ta::if  fS: 6ay be notcci. (duties  6ibOve
;; ilil  ;;';;",;'; ;,-,.'r """p,"r,;.i;,-;;-";;.i";; 
o,??, i, rhe c'r).
J,O. Eesui'.;s_by Elour.'e ,:i --EI-oiLic!g (sue f.rb1e-'s and Hfa.irhr: ll.'  6)
Tlie tabl-c bclow shcv,r;l tI.c ,:rritnrncticel fl.vcrage cf  tl.e Cuti-es
and thc ninth decilc  for  some irrporl,ant groups of producls (thc  cocle
nUmbers refer  to  t}e  chapters of the Brusseis Nomenclature.) '
Aril;hmetica,l averaAg  llinth  decito
25-27:  lii3e1'41 Prcduc tc
28-40: Protlucls of the cirernicai
and alliecl  iridustrir-'s  I?-,9
47 -49:  Paper-nalcing nateriltl;
Paper and PaPer boarC
anri articles  thercci'
5O-6t:  Textiles  arid textile
artioies
?3-V:  Iron and steeJ- and
arti-clcs  thercof
B4-8t:  Machinery ani niechanical.
appliances; elcctr^j-cal '  e cluipment; Parts
thereof  ]-a ' o
86,-89: Transport ecluipnent
90-92:  Variou.u pi'oducts
a Ib.  .:  aL.O
1.r-. 1  l-0.8 11.2-  2c ,3 22"9 19.8
ti).O  )+,o
'50,L 20.5
/  ^a  n  ^- t).o  lo.r  zr.l  /1t  L
14. b  18 .'l re .7  w.6  2'l ,ti
-"r.2.8 )3.2  20,1  2-1.4. 2.:,.1 2-9.)
14. O  Zg .6  2g ,L  18. B  6l.y  4Z .Z
CET USA  UK?
r  Q  -rA  (,'t




The averagee shcl that  th.  trchem;L.cals'1  ,  ?tti:xtilesl',  and-lrvarious
productsrr groups are thr: most hi-ghl.v tr,rotected in  thc 'Lhree fariffs.
Nevertheless  the deviatiori in  relation  io  the othei' Broups is  hi6her
in  the UST and UKT than in  the CET.  The ninth aeciie is  nct
appreciably higher in  the CilT, rvhcrcas in  tlie twr.i clher taliffs  it
shows a congiderablo proportion o-f irigh ciui;ies for  +;hesc gl'oups,-[il- r'-6/64
lf.  Conclusigns
l[ihethcr v,'o exanine the toi;;i,  margirr:.-!- or cond.itione.l distribu-
tions  or consider ,-li,striburiti: .; b;i catc6orr-.ji cr  sroups of products,
the siruotura'l  fearures ot' thc t.rFec tariffs  iLlways allpeau clearly:
(a)  The 01lT is  lowcr tiian thc othcr t,vo tarif  fs;  it  is  l.css
dispers'd a:r'u inci'.r,-lcs f ewe l  iii;;h ciubi -:sl
(U)  The cieviartion bctwecn tirc CEI' and tire ot.hcr tariffs  is
rouglily';h*  samrr in  tire vrrious  c:.icSolir.,ri oi  producLs;
(c)  The U; brrriff  is  v,]rll rlispe lst;c'. :!t-rc,. l:clud,s  a ccrrsiderabl-e
--nn^-ti ^- of  hi.6;h drrtie si lJr  vyv.r  v+vir  rrJ-blr  u 
^ 
utv,)t
(A)  The gcner.al features of  thc. UK tariff  ar,-- i'eirly  close to
those of thi  US tariff  ,  but thc lIIi- tarj.ff  is  Qoncr-rnfr3lsd
on sevei'el clcarly  dcfineci lcvels  of Cut:-rs;
e)  Althougir on the averagie th,,rc j-s a certain  link  between the
levef  of duties in  each tariff,  the. disparitics  are
considerabl-e,-t}-
{-t  }
7  r  \L/ leve_L o1 dutacs
-
4  -L//  \JT e I
i-
Conpara'ri';'* fr etlucncies cf  dutics:
in  the Comrnon External Tarriff of EEC (Cnt)
in  the UniLeci States Tariff  (UST)
in  thc Unj-icd KinACom Tari ff  (UKT)
(LIarqinal dist ri-buti ons )
Absolute i'requcnci.,o 
( t ) Refative frequcttcies
-
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nt  .  r  ! iYl-nEn oecl_le
Int er-decil e
deviation
L7 .B  18.4
L4.2  17 .B
I-UfU
^l z.L+  -) . ,







(f)  For greater clerrity  the dr.ities are taken in  ranges of whole nur:lber.r,
but in  fact  the upper linit  shoufd bc increased by 0.!  to alrow fo::
duties or j-ncj-dences with decimal points.  Th.:se arer howevcr, com--
nnneti ve-l v rara And i t'.' anv case account has been taken in  the cafcu ta- I/'^-qwf!!iJ
tions  of  their  decirnai porti-on a.nd the exact limits  of the classes"
(e) it  should. be notecl that  thcse absolut,, frcquencics  do riot rcprcsenr.
,  numbors of ritariff  hcadingstt but numbe.rs of lines  in  the cornparativc
t;rb1e of duties.  In absolute value thcse numbers clepend on the
structure of  Lhe classification  adoptcd f or this  terble (seu se" ,  t)  ,
This is  why the text  r..entfen-s only thc' rvlert,ive frequencies.*t?- f bf.t*to {rqreral { Absolut e' fre quencv Relati:g__lf e_SenaT re
1*l'
Devigtion (points)
cof )  U,$E or UKT
-
( ncge.tive deviations  )
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CET <'U'58 or UKT
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DeviatiorLs of  1O or
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146  10  3 ?60
Level of  UST duties +




























See notes to Table 1.Conditiosal" riistnibution of UI{T cLuties
i-n relatien fo CIf d.uties
r-Or,9*
(Abeclute frequencies)
l,gvei of CET duties
IreveL. of UIrT d.r.rijes, O  L-5  6"-rc f.i*15  Lt'-}c  2i-2'  2-()-4A Toterl
Ab.soirrte frequetrcies
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Tli  -h+h  rlaai'l  o
l{inth decile.
-..  -  l- 9tn/ LaT, decale
deviation
'/ O.1  (.(
7.t  10.2
8 .2  14.9
9"2  17.2
10.2  18.2
l,^n^ Ld.*  c\J.1
L7 -3  26.0
19.9  32.r
1I.O  34.3

























































































See notes to Table 1.-\\.l- lf,  r  't. | 4  t\  J.r1  .1
t
il"*q"un";. disiribuiiori  of the cl.uties by uiain
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14.1 14,6
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r'\  1 vr  J
1TST UKT
^1 '),'1  /."+
t.Y  '1 .)
9"+ lo.6
47 ,r  Lr.3
L4.5 ,4 .9
-/.  (  z.  L
2.9  3,L
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tj-on  7 ,I
3. r  6,3
/-- t.v  b. J
?4.8 11,0
I!.'7  i",  O
L'/ .'  L3.9
7,o  Z,Ll
L6 "'l  32 "c
T9.4. 14.4
L?.9 14.9
?,4  7 ,8
^  ---.  l) tL. z  /_v.o
LV"'  lV/ 16.1.7 l677
Level of dutv #















24,B 1t.o  a5.T zB.z 28.4
See notes to ?able 1.
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r-r  Ii,-  ::f"3/\rnTrrrT/\lIc  A\Tn  rTl
;Il*|t/.lf  -\!J\''-'-Ltlli-Ltr!,J  nlrv  rWTIi]Id 1:Ssru-.i gg&
I.ho tariff  riegoiiating ptan to be dra"wn up as part of the
preperatione fol: tiiei tyado nesotiati,One provid*d f,or in the r*oolution
uaopt.* by the GA1I Minlsteriil  lteeting on fhy 21 t  L96tr-*T?t establieh
irr additian co t,he genersl ruie of f-inoar reduction of, dutl.es a opecial
rule for handLing iiseneitiver! casea of d.isparity.
the Siffi*B.lties so far encounterqd in sstrriag thie problom have
brought lt  rath*r pnona{.nently into the publ"ic e9€, a$d the n';merou6
cornncntalies on it  givo fise to sorne confu'Sion and various misunder-
standings as to its  real meaning and rcope.  An objective e:ramination
of the ortgin, baohground and factual tr;rne of this problern should ilirow
light  on tie  confusion and clear up misunderstandings.
The dispa:'itv problem not an-:i,4v-ention cf the Co
Since it  ryas si-gned. bn October JO, 3-947 the Goneral Agreoment on
Tariffs and Trade hal prorri.{ed the getbing for a ccrtain number of
"orrf""urroes(1) 
ainecl, iirst  at puttils  an end' to the f,ariff  war and,
secondly, C,t progrressi.Jely  reeucing tariff  barriers betrryeen the Contract-
ing P3i'1is5.
It  is  insi,ructive  to  study the changing proced.ures  followed in
these negotlaiions.  Three phases can be distinguished:
(a)  The traditional  aPProach;
(l)  The 196C-52 negotiatiof,e, icnovrn as the Dil1on rouncl;
(r)  Thc con-;ng tradi: ncgobiations.
Tiie traditional  approach coneisterl in  each Contracting  Pa31y
nortner)-l-y negotiating every ocncossj-on it  off ered with  the Contrecting
Party wi:ich-'vras  i ts  main eupplj.er of *th*  product in  question.  Any
.r.rnn.'s!F!'inr qrrnterl to i;: Contrrictin6; Party nas 1.p.g9-lg*-extended to
j'  "''
aLl- the o'bhers under the most-favoured-nation ilause'  Tbus the results
of  origlrrally  bitaberal  negotintions were treaterl as results  to  be
r.ppiicd nu }tila.'; erall--v
fh.2 negoti*tions iherefore procceCed on a product-by-proeiuct  and.
c or:ntry-by-countrY i:asis'
Fr.om the 1,!!O-51 Torquay Conf,erence onrrtards it  bccane increaeingLy
cLear that  sorge incLustriai countries vthose tariffe  vrere low:r initiaily
than tho6e of th.r other countrles found it  difficnlt  to go beyond a
ce rtaln  point,  whereas the tarif  fs  of  tbe other,s continued. to  i:e ef fec-
tivi:  after  the reductions agrced to.'  The problem of disparities  be'bween
"'/"'
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:f the tariffs  wao pose,l and it  led tbe prodr:Qt*oy-pz'oduct method of
negotiailon tc  a Ceed encl "
Var:ious suggestion,s were rs&s,e for  overccnnin6 these riifficulties'
In  L952 the Benilor, 
"ountries 
prss$nted a plan providing for  a prior
reduction of the hi-gh tarj-ffs  so tirat  the negotiat'ion couid then-
procee<l on tariffE  of  csnparable 1evel.  In  1951 france-.propoeed tbe
irif:-*iin  l'1gn rryh1ch was for  an autonetic redr-rctj.cn of 3&  in  three
y;;;;-iiQL  p,:: annurrr) at  the same time lopping the pel1s.above certain
levels ar:d eonvorsel:I oetting rninimun fi6Uroc ireiow whioh tl:e duties
'grolrL.i. not be rarluged.  those p3-ans 'rsere }}o? scceptecll
Hotryeve r,  'Lhe L950-/c'Z negotiaiion -  ihe Di-lLoll f ourid' -  wa's a first
turning poinr,.  ?hils nesofi;tiou  spran$ frora a combiuntion oi  twc
faciorsr  fi:retn  the Fower grante.l to  tbe ilnited $tates ASml-nistratlon
Ui"tit--f95Bl;;  on trade agreements to negotiate r,educi'ions in  existing
duties of  u.p ta Ztrlr, anC secondly, the proposal of the European
Economic Conrmunity io  ne.gatiate ine bindi-ng of tho 2CFl reduction which
haC serve,f as the basis of cal-culation for  the approxinration of  the
na.tional tariffs  towards the comnon external tariff  in  accordance with
the dqcir:ion of l'Iay 12, 1950 to  speed up the cuFtoms union'
fhs Comilrunity fu:the.r proposeC that  thts  ZCf/o reduction should !?  '
effected. b1r the linear  method Lut onL{ Grcat Britain  in  papt acceptecl  '
bhie r,ropo$a1, the other Contracting Partios  having stated thelr  preference
for  the product-by product methed.
The Di'l-Lon round was a iranpitional  fbrn of negotiation'' sometimes
product hJ. proriucf ,  and sometlnes,lLnear,  The linear  approach was ''
'first  trie ct out there, but the reoults  rve:'e tlj.Bappoin'ting: the
im.balances bet$.,een the tar.iff  stiuctnres  of the varicrtt'6 c,ountr"les nQ'
1on6ei. pe::rr:ltt.:c tire low tariff  c.Quntrieo to  obtain for  their  export
p"qi.'"tisuff:cientadvanf,agestoerrgurereciprocj.ty'"
It  then became cl,ear that  the roethod of negotiating, product by.
product cn fhe :iiain supplier prinqiple  waF no longer effective
+ i -.''  i -  Nnrr,'.:tlrF  red  this  fac t
. .  The Gr;T? Iiinisteris.]  lileeting in  Nove*rber_ 1961 lac3g.nil
anc for  tho ,future arlvccated the linear  formula.  By the Trade,
f*f*nsio:i  l\ct  ihe United Staies Qon6ress-g3"Y  the Adninisiratiol  po.weT:
to ne6otiate tsrriff  :'sdo:ctions of u[  t'a 5o/c in  tnis  vray'  The-Conntnil].;  '
grc,rie,cl trre pae sirrs rr  1i1is Biil  as a rnanifestaiion of the.::tdin*-:"  .:f  '
.its  clrief 'tia.,3:-ng iariri.rr  to  create the indispensab'le condiiions for.a
s*ccessfri3. joinl:  cifort,.  It  was now pos{iible' to cagry out an exercas-e 
'
.in tariff  d:isarmament  on a scale hitherto  unknov'ja. the resolutio4 of '
l..l"yai,L9,oic.i.-g:tedt}:eroadtobhigriewnegotieticn.
The fLrctual situaticrr
"  If  r:e :fce1 ihat  n.eg.otiating methods must^9hangg, we must have an
idea cf  what is  needed for  fresh progress;  01d prejudices and habits
a  .  af  ..  a-lb-
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of thought niust givc way to a fresh atr,proach' long,-ostablishecl  concepts
lnpvitabj-y chanl;e in  con'i:ext ani content. In partieular,  the reciprocity
prinsiple  ca^n no -1on6er be thou6ht of only in  narrow terils of the
cotoparitive value of the con<,cssioris  actually  exeha^r:ged',  but rather in
terms of balance and coirparabj-lity of the sibuationsto be ati;ained'
l, dynanic anci f orr,varcl-loojting conlept of recipr oottV iirust be substituted'
for  a static  ooncept ivhich has been outpaoeci by the onwarcL march of
ta"r-iff reduction.
If  p::ogress o1l these l;.ncs vrere i;o prove ii.ipossiL'1e, the problein
of clisiquiti'or:-um between tariff  struotures, i'on  the problem of
dlslarities,  wouici bri-ng the nrethod" of linear  reduction in  its  turn
tb i  d.eac1 ,gnd, for  the neeC -bo get round this  problem bl' the exped'ient
of elxceptions  woufd- inevitabl;r wirittle  clo'n':r' ttro seope anc contont of
the negotiations'
The seconcl part of this  nier'loral:chrrn, 'rlhich makes a statisti<;al
eoiii:lnri son of thil i.;.J.  Coirt,i,otl external iariff  ,  the United States tariff
vvrrrl/  @r
ancl the Unitecl- iiJ-ngdLorir tariff,  axrply i.or,'ronstra-bes ',vhere the d-isecluilibriuni
lretWecyr the tariff  structures lies.'.lhc  i.j.ilT is  lower bhan the other two
tariffs;  it  is  less d-ispcrsed"  and- it  includ.ls fewer hiShs a^ncl lows"
por ins-b;nce, on:ry fi" ol  tHu i-T  duties are ahove 2J7b, as against 2Bi1
bf tne U.S" ii.-,t:-sl and 3C,lJ7a of the; Unitect-Kin6d.orn clutles. Above lla
;'r...r-tt *'L.a -.rnn:-,r.rtj_ons axe as foflovls z A"VJib in  the f.r,j.T", as against \fL{ uJ ,  ulrv  }/r  v!  v.
,lC.4it in  ttrc U"S" i;a:'iff  anc 1 "Vi in the Tinitecl Kingcior'r tariff  " It  is
cfeai ihat  a straightforivard- reduction of ,W v,lould oonsiuerably ag5ravate
the effect  of this  d-isequliibriuin,  for  it  vrould bring a very high propor-
tion  of the t,1",:j,T. ilovn: to  an ertreuely low or ni1 level of protcotiont
1n,'hereas the U'S, tariff  v,rould coittinue -i;o afford- a much larger measure
of proteution.
The resoiu"bion acloptcd. by th,:r ilinisters  on iJay 21, 1963r offers
q1i tlie necessary eleraents for  d.ealing aciecluatcly vuith the problen of
disparitres" I-b lefines  j-n hari,ionious and bal.nced f.rshion the prinsiples
;i;;-sf,'o..rf,i  serve as a basj-s forbhe  negotiation. Aio:rg l+ith-bhe general
$u1e of su',rstantial linear ::cduc-tion, it  recognizoOthe existence of the
Broblen of d.isparitirjs, lafs  d.oum the principle  of hai:aling thls  by a
speo:-ai rulc  --  aLso'of a*ouiatic an0 general applicatlon --  vrhose
effect nugt be to rectuoe sensitive ctisirarities in'cracle" It  furthermote
pb=ns ihe probleil of cor-rntries whose tariffs  have a lower general
irrti,iurr** *1d lv]:.ich might thereblr be facsCr vrith a problen of reciprocity'
oo-{Ll-
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$tudi;rs ruitlr a view to  inpleraenbing tht& regolution,  particularly
in  the matfer of pinpoini;ing aerisitJ-ve tlisparities  end dravring up !h9
siie'ci.a.ir.u}ctct,eappl:.i-cdtothem,ha.verunintocertainoiffj.cultien.
tler*  ie  a fe^irly uieesprcad tendency to a.t?ribrrte these dtfficulties
to ihe fact.i;hat  the Coirmunity has rais*d  the Xrroblenn of oisparities'
T}:is is  tant&nfirr:t to  collfuein6l the pro'cler:t with the solution'
The chiryf *J,fficul"ty l-s the prob}eB facing tlt  einall Suropean
countr:.es vrl.l:ch fear ?hai for  tbe6 the narrowing of disparities  nay
irapair. the aclvantages which the appS.ication Of, llie  general rule  would
sn*'drq the$ t11 *Eciss io  the Corrurunitf &arl{"st, the Shief oUilet  for
theXr *s3rorts.
Thr: probler"n ie  a real  one but if  it  exiet'e this  is  not because the
Cornnunity wishes tO renolve the quesfion of rJisparities,but  because
attempta at  atiJust*tent can be in  one ij.rection  only.  In fact  two
soiutic;rs ere poesi,ble to ma]<e this  adjustnr:tit:  either  the low duties
fcllow  the gerreral rule  and the blgh auties come down more, or the
higir duti+s follo'v  the general 1ulJ and, in  this  caso' the low Cutiee
ere recluce,l less.  llowever, the'lrorkin8 hypothesis of a JAlo reducbiorr
chol.en fcr: the general rule  ccincides with the ljrnit  of the mandate to
re,lucc duties conferrecr hy the Trarle Expansion Act and therefore leaves
no choice but to e.pply th.e aecond solution
lie,.rertheless, ths Conrn'';nj-ty v,rishes to do everything- ]n its  power
to miLi-gate ihe ei'fec'bs of tirls  sibuation,  whose inevitable  impfica-
l-innni,{:rrleoe'nlzesal.bhoriShiteanr:otaccepf,responeibilityforthem.